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STIGMATIZATION AND DISCRIMINATION:

VISITATION RIGHTS

OF NONCUSTODIAL HOMOSEXUAL PARENTS AND THE
EFFECT OF PARENTAL DEPRIVATION ON
CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION

The division of a family following a divorce and the subsequent
reordering of legal relationships present numerous difficulties for courts
determining custodial and visitation issues. Courts are frequently called
upon to resolve such sensitive issues as which parent is better suited to
serve as the child's custodian, and whether visitation with the child
should be granted to the noncustodial parent. These issues are further
complicated when one parent is homosexual I but has a child from a heterosexual marriage. 2 In this situation, many courts deny custody to the
3
gay parent and severely restrict or deny visitation with the natural child.
This Note examines the legal status of homosexual parents seeking
post-divorce visitation. In many jurisdictions, parental rights are denied
on the basis of prejudicial and false judicial rationales. This Note argues
that children are harmed more by deprivation of parental contact when
1. The terminology regarding individuals who are sexually oriented toward persons
of the same gender is often imprecise. The terms "homosexual" and "gay" are used
either synonomously, to refer only to males, or are used to refer to both males and females. According to one historian, the word "homosexual" is a relatively new term, and
has been criticized because of its "bastard origin and vague connotations." JOHN BoSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY 43 (1980). Boswell asserted
that "gay" is a more accurate and useful word, in that it refers to "persons who are conscious of erotic preference for their own gender." Id. The term "homosexual" is broader,
and "comprises all sexual phenomena between persons of the same gender, whether the
result of conscious preference, subliminal desire, or circumstantial exigency." Id. at 44.
This Note follows contemporary usage and employs the terms "gay" and "homosexual" to refer to both men and women who are sexually and emotionally oriented toward
persons of the same gender and "lesbian" to refer exclusively to gay females. However,
"homosexual" is used as an adjective, rather than a noun. Boswell noted:
The word 'homosexual' implicitly suggests that the primary distinguishing
characteristic of gay people is their sexuality.... Sexual interest and expression
vary dramatically in the human population, and a person's sexual interest may be
slight without precluding the realization that he or she is attracted to persons of
the same gender and hence distinct in some way from the majority.
Id. at 45. See also Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-LacedJudges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 804 (1979) ("[Ulsing 'homosexual' as a
noun ... implies a being whose sole dimension is an erotic one.").
2. A related issue beyond the scope of this article is whether a lesbian woman is
entitled to parental rights following the termination of her relationship with another woman when her companion has borne a child conceived through artificial insemination. See
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991), aff'g 552 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div.
1990) (woman could not be considered a parent and had no visitation rights); In re Interest
of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991), aff'g 459 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (same).
See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet
the N\eeds of Children in Lesbian-lother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459
(1990) (arguing that parenthood should be redefined to include anyone in a functional
parent-child relationship).
3. See cases cited infra notes 20-21, 23-27.
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visitation is denied than by the alleged adverse effects caused by exposure to a parent's homosexuality. The child's best interests are served
when courts engage in unbiased inquiry regarding gay parents and acknowledge that parental contact is important for the child's psychological development.
Part I of this Note examines visitation actions and the standards that
courts use to evaluate such disputes. Part II reveals the approaches
courts use in visitation cases involving homosexual parents. Part III
scrutinizes the factors courts advance to support presumptions of gay
parents' unfitness. Part IV surveys the psychological research regarding
the effects on a child deprived of post-divorce visitation and argues that
the child's best interests are served by continued visitation with the noncustodial parent, absent an affirmative showing of harm as a result of
exposure to the parent's homosexuality.
I.

POST-DIVORCE VISITATION

Post-divorce visitation awards are generally decided simultaneously
with custody determinations. 4 The typical visitation order occurs after
sole custody 5 is awarded to a party in the divorce. Courts usually grant
the noncustodial parent visitation with the child, absent any evidence of
parental unfitness. The concept of "best interests of the child" is the
6
primary consideration in both custody and visitation adjudications.
4. Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Miller, 385 A.2d 992, 994 (Pa. 1978). Visitation
decisions are usually made in the context of custody determinations between natural parents, although visitation disputes also occur in situations involving nonparents. More
states are awarding visitation rights to nonparents. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117
(Supp. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(7) (1985 & Supp. 1990). See generally Henry H.
Foster & Davis J. Freed, GrandparentVisitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 ST. Louis U. L.J.
643 (1979); Samuel V. Schoonmaker III et al., ConstitutionalIssues Raised by Third-PartyAccess
to Children, 25 FAM. L.Q. 95 (1991); Richard S. Victor et al., Statutory Review of Third-Party
Rights Regarding Custody, Visitation, and Support, 25 FAM. L.Q 19 (1991); Howard G.
Zaharoff, Access to Children: Towards a Model Statutefor Third Parties, 15 FAM. L.Q. 165 (1981);
MichaelJ. Lewinski, Note, Visitation Beyond the TraditionalLimitations, 60 IND. L.J. 191 (1984)
(arguing that visitation rights should be granted to any third party if such visitation would
benefit the child).
5. Sole custody is not the only possible award; increasingly, courts are granting joint
custody to parents. Joint custody has been defined as "co-parenting" following a divorce.
H. Jay Folberg & Marva Graham,JointCustody of Children FollowingDivorce, 12 U.C. DAVis L.
REV. 523, 528-29 (1979). "Its distinguishing feature is that both parents retain legal responsibility and authority for the care and control of the child .... " Id. Joint custody
differs from sole custody in that the parents share legal custody of the child, and are jointly
responsible for making major decisions regarding the child's welfare. Physical custody
may be split between the parents or retained primarily by one parent. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 518.003(3) (1990). Over half of the states currently authorize joint custody awards by
statute. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992). Courts may award
joint custody even if not authorized by statute. See generally DavidJ. Miller,Joint Custody, 13
FAM. L.Q. 345 (1979); Holly L. Robinson,Joint Custody: An Idea Whose Time has Come, 21 J.
FAM. L. 641 (1982-1983); Sheila F.G. Schwartz, Toward a Presumption of Joint Custody, 18
FAM. L.Q. 225 (1984).

6. The concept of the "best interests of the child" is not new. Judge Turley stated in
1843: "It is to be observed that in all cases the interest and welfare of the child is the great
leading object to be attained .... " Paine v. Paine, 23 Tenn. 523, 535 (4 Hum.) (1843).
Judge Cardozo expanded upon the best interests standard in Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E.
624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) ("[A judge] acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest
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Virtually every jurisdiction requires courts to award custody and visitation rights based on each jurisdiction's adaptation of this standard. 7 In
visitation cases, courts often presume that some form of continued access by the noncustodial parent is in the child's best interests.8 Visitaof the child."). Cardozo recognized that in a custody proceeding a court is not determining rights as it does in an adversary proceeding. Rather, the court is seeking to place the
child in the best environment in which to mature.
The best interests standard is by nature indeterminate. Although some custody statutes list relevant factors that a court must consider, these guidelines are open to considerable interpretation. California's custody statute states:
In making a determination of the best interests of the child . . .the court
shall, among any other factors it finds relevant, consider all of the following: (a)
The health, safety and welfare of the child[,] (b) [a]ny history of abuse by one
parent against the child ...[and] (c) [t]he nature and amount of contact with both
parents.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4608(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1992).
Some commentators have criticized decisions made under the best interests standard
as biased and often irrational. One commentator noted:
Custody litigation, unlike most other litigation, attempts to predict the future
rather than to understand the past. In most other litigation, the result will depend upon the court's determination that some event did or did not take place at
an earlier time. Aside from possibly bearing on credibility, the litigants' personality, priorities, lifestyle, financial resources, emotional stability, and other personal
attributes have no relevance to the outcome. In custody litigation ... those very
factors will determine the result in large measure, with the court making a judgment as to whether the child is likely in the future to be "better off" with one
parent than with the other. Not surprisingly, decisions made in this framework
are less a product of reasoned application of precedent than of the personality,
temperament, background, interests, and biases of the trial judge or the community that elected him.
Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modication of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 762
(1985) (footnotes omitted). Another author stated that "neither legislatures nor custom
has provided judges with a coherent framework for thinking about what children's interests are. [An] equally serious [flaw] has been the inability ofjudges to make accurate determinations . . . of the quality of most individual children's relationships with their
parents or of parents' skills at childrearing." David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive
Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 477, 568 (1984). See also Robert H.
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication:Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRORS. 226 (1975) (discussing the consequences of indeterminate custody
standards).
7. This standard gives courts a great deal of discretion in the determination of parental fitness as it relates to the child's best interests. Steve Susoeff, Note, Assessing Children 's Best Interests IVhen a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32
UCLA L. REV. 852, 853 (1985). The best interests standard is mandated by statute in most
states for custody disputes. Many statutes list the factors that a judge must consider in
determining the child's best interests. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4608(a)-(c) (West Supp.
1992); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1987) (listing factors to be considered in custody
determinations). Other statutes only require that the best interests standard be applied
and give no guidance to judges. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-113 (1990) (specifying application of best interests test without listing factors). See generally HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF
DoMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 19.4, at 797 & nn.3-4 (2d ed. 1988) (citing
statutes and cases employing the best interests standard). In other states, case law requires that judges award custody based on the child's best interests. See, e.g., Wolff v.
Wolff, 349 N.W.2d 656, 658 (S.D. 1984).
In visitation cases, the best interests standard is also frequently required by statute.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(b)-59 (1991); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-914 (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(7) (1985 & Supp. 1991); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7.3 (Burns Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. § 518.175(l) (1990); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney Supp. 1991). If not mandated by statute, case law may require
that the child's best interests prevail in visitation actions. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 385 So.

2d 1323 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980).
8.

In many states, the presumption of visitation by the non-custodial parent is man-
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tion is typically restricted only if there is evidence that the child will be
harmed by contact with the parent. 9
Visitation awards vary in the degree of circumscription imposed.' 0
Courts prefer to grant "reasonable" or "general" visitation rights to the
dated by statute. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125.460 (Michie 1986); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5301 (Supp. 1991). See also In re Marriage of Matthews, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879,
886 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating that courts should attempt to preserve visitation rights whenever possible). In some states, joint custody is presumed to be in the child's best interests
by statute. See supra note 5. In these states, the term "visitation" might not be not used
because each parent possesses legal custody of the child. Rather, such statutes use other
terms to express the concept of visitation with each parent for a period of time. See, e.g.,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (F) (Michie 1989) (authorizing a "period of responsibility" to
each parent).
9. Many states follow the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act's visitation provision,
which states, "[a] parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriously
the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health." UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 407(a), 9A U.L.A. 612 (1987). See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337(A) (Supp. 1991);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129 (1987 & Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-24 (Burns 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1616(a) (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.400(1) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1992);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-217(1) (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.05.22(2) (1991); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.09.240 (1989).
Another group of states has modified the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provision while still retaining the basic intent of the Act. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 727
(Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE § 598.41(1) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05(A) (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1990); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301-5310 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-5-16 (1988 & Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(4) (1989 & Supp. 1990); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-15(b)(1) (1986 & Supp. 1991).
Other states have no statute dealing specifically with visitation, implicitly leaving visitation awards to the discretion of the court. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989); ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.24.150 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-107
(Michie 1991); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Baldwin
1984); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131, 134 (West Supp. 1992); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § I201(b)(1) (1991); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-364 (1988 & Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480 (1986 & Supp. 1989);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.17(I) (1983 & Supp. 1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2a:34-23 (West
1987 & Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112 (West Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-45 (1984); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-6-101 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie 1983 & Supp. 1991); Wyo.
STAT. § 20-2-113 (1977 & Supp. 1991).
10. A radical alternative to the traditional visitation award was proposed by Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit. SeeJOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL; BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

(2d ed. 1979). The authors opposed legally enforceable visitation altogether and contended that all decisions regarding visitation should be left to the discretion of the custodial parent. Id. at 38. Thus, the noncustodial parent would have no legally enforceable
right whatsoever and visitation could be completely foreclosed by the custodial parent.
The authors stated:
Once it is determined who will be the custodial parent, it is that parent, not the
court, who must decide under what conditions he or she wishes to raise the child.
Thus, the noncustodial parent should have no legally enforceable right to visit
the child, and the custodial parent should have the right to decide whether it is
desirable for the child to have such visits.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The authors based their conclusion upon the theory that the relationship between the
child and the "psychological parent" is crucial. The psychological parent, as opposed to
the biological parent, is the one who meets the child's emotional and psychological needs,
as well as providing physical care. Id. at 17. The authors argue that even a short absence
by the psychological parent may harm the child. Thus, continuity of the relationship with
the psychological parent and child must be maintained to the greatest extent possible. Id.
at 31-34. If the parents do not have positive contact with each other, visitation may disrupt
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noncustodial parent. "General" visitation awards impose no specific
time or place for the visit, leaving the details of the visit to the divorced
parents.' I Such an award presumes the parents are capable of cooperation and can arrange a mutually acceptable schedule. 12 If the parents
cannot cooperate to arrive at an agreement, the court may impose "specific" visitation. Conditions regarding the date, day of the week, time,
3
location and circumstances of visitation may be judicially imposed.'
II.

SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CUSTODY, AND VISITATION

Custody and visitation disputes involving homosexual parents and
their children arise frequently.14 As in any custody or visitation determination, courts must decide whether a gay parent is fit to serve as the
child's custodian, or, alternatively, if the parent is fit to have visitation
with the child.' 5 The crucial analysis is the court's perception of the
the needed continuity with the psychological parent because of the inherent loyalty conflicts of the child. Id. at 37-38.
The implications of the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit thesis extend beyond visitation
rights. The authors assert that recognizing the primacy of the psychological parent-child
relationship compels many profound changes in the legal ordering of the family relationship. They contend that the time periods involved in custodial and adoptive decisionmaking be sharply reduced. Thus, infants should be placed even before birth and custody
decisions should be made prior to the divorce. Correspondingly, post-divorce custody
modification would be eliminated. Id. at 42-47.
Courts have not adopted the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit approach to visitation, and
commentators have strongly criticized their thesis. The book was criticized for failing to
provide any empirical data supporting the underlying presumptions. See Daniel Katkin et
al., Above and Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: An Inquiry into the Relationship Between Social

Science and Social Action, 8 LAw & Soc. REV. 669 (1974). The Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
thesis has also been criticized on policy grounds. Commentators have pointed out that the
practical effects of giving one parent complete control over visitation would be vengeful
behavior and extortion. See Henry H. Foster, A Review of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,
12 WILLIAMEr-rE L. REv. 545, 551 (1976); Steven L. Novinson, Post-Divorce Visitation: Untying the TriangularKnot, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 121, 160-65 (1983). Given the accepted view
that children should have continued contact with noncustodial parents (so long as neither
parent is homosexual), it seems unlikely that the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit approach to
visitation will be adopted by any court.
11. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dirnberger, 773 P.2d 330 (Mont. 1989).
12. Judith A. Fournie, Note, Post-Divorce Visitation: A Study in the Deprivation of Rights, 27
DE PAUL L. REV. 113, 114-15 (1977).
13. See, e.g., Ward v. Sams, 391 S.E.2d 748 (W. Va. 1990) (visitation order was
amended to include specific times, days, and holidays, and also provided that visitation was
to take place away from the mother's former sister-in-law).
14. There are approximately three million homosexual parents in the United States,
and between eight and ten million children are raised in these households. Note, Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1629 (1989). Custody issues are the most litigated of gay and lesbian issues. See Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent
Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311, 327 (1980-1981).
Suits in which gay parents fight to gain custody or visitation of their children have
increased in recent years and are expected to increase further. This is probably due to
growing pride on the part of gay parents as well as a growing support system to help them
in these cases. See Rivera, supra note 1, at 886.
15. A parent's same-sex orientation usually becomes an issue only when that parent is
at the time involved in a relationship with a person of the same gender. A parent's sexual
orientation in the abstract may not necessarily provide adequate grounds for a denial of
custody or visitation. Note, Custody Denials to Parentsin Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection Anolysis, 102 HARV. L. REV. 617, 618-19 & n.9 (1989).
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impact that the parent's homosexuality has or will have upon the child. 16
In visitation disputes, courts use two different approaches to make this
evaluation.1 7 Some courts create an irrebuttable presumption that a gay
parent is unfit to have custody or visitation. 18 Other courts reject that
presumption and rule that visitation may only be denied upon an affirmative showing of a nexus between the parent's sexual orientation and
any adverse effect upon the child. 19
A.

Irrebuttable PresumptionJurisdictions

Courts adopting an irrebuttable presumption of parental unfitness
for homosexual parents generally hold that custody of the child shall not
be granted to that parent. Custody is denied whether or not the child
would suffer any adverse effect from the parent's homosexuality and regardless of any evidence that the heterosexual parent is unfit.2 0 The
same approach is used to determine visitation, although outright denial
of visitation is rare. 2 1 Instead, courts commonly impose a variety of restrictions upon the gay parent's visitation. Most commonly, the homosexual parent is not allowed to have the child overnight 22 or have the
same-sex companion present during the visitation period. 23 Some
courts have ordered that the child cannot be in the presence of other
"known homosexuals" 24 or even be in the presence of any unrelated
member of the parent's sex. 2 5 The effect of these restrictions is that the
16. Custody and visitation statutes in nearly half of the states list relevant factors for
determining the child's best interests; many of these factors can be interpreted to allow
judges to consider the parent's sexual orientation. For example, Alabama law allows consideration of a parent's "moral character." ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989). But see D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-911(a)(5), 16-914(a) (1989) (only jurisdiction with a statute declaring sexual
orientation irrelevant in determining custody or visitation). See generally Donald H. Stone,
The Moral Dilemma: Child Custody When One Parent is Homosexual or Lesbian-An Empirical
Study, 23 SUFFOLK L. REV. 711 (1989) (survey of 81 family law attorneys regarding their
impressions of custody cases involving homosexual parents).
17. In custody disputes, a third approach is also used. These courts impose a rebuttable presumption which places the burden on the gay parent to prove that his or her
sexual orientation will not harm the child. See Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513
(Ark. Ct. App. 1987); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981); M.J.P. v.
J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1982); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1985).
18. See cases cited infra notes 20-21, 23-27.
19. See cases cited infra notes 60-62.
20. See S v. S, 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981);
N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Bennett v. O'Rourke, No.
83D1327, 1985 WL 3464, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1985); Dailey v. Dailey, 635
S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 693 (Va. 1985).
21. See Irish v. Irish, 300 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); White v. Thompson,
569 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (Miss. 1990); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987);J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (court rejected expert
testimony that stated no harm had or would occur to the child).
22. See, e.g.,
In rejane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
23. See, e.g., Irish,
300 N.W.2d at 741; L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638 (App. Div. 1978); Collins v. Collins,
No. 87-238-I, 1988 WL 30173, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 30, 1988).
24. See Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
25. See Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1069 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
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homosexual parent is often effectively prevented from visiting or having
meaningful contact with his or her child.
A typical case utilizing an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness is
P.
p.
P.W 26 InJ.P., the Missouri Court of Appeals considered an acp.
tion to modify a child custody decree. 27 The father and mother in the
action married and had a daughter in 1986.28 The wife left her husband
and commenced divorce proceedings after learning that he was involved
in a homosexual relationship during the marriage. 2 9 The father continued this relationship after the separation and moved in with his companion.3 0 The court granted the divorces' and ruled that the father could
have visitation with the child for ten days every other month.3 2 Pursuant
to an interim visitation order, the child visited the father for ten days
33
following the divorce.
The mother moved to modify the custody order in 1988 to restrict
visitation. 3 4 At the hearing, the mother testified that the child's behavior negatively changed and physical abuse was present following the
visit.3 5 The mother stated that she was concerned about the child's exposure to the AIDS virus as a result of contact with the father.3 6 The
trial court ruled that the evidence did not establish a change of circumstances and, therefore, visitation could not be denied.3 7 However, the
trial court modified the visitation order by ruling that neither the father's lover nor any other live-in companion could be present in the
home during the visitation period. Additionally, the father's companion
could not exercise any discipline over the child nor accompany the father when visiting the child outside the home. 38 Following the trial
court's ruling, the mother appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals,
contending that the restrictions were inadequate.3 9 The father cross40
appealed, asserting that the restrictions were improperly imposed.
TheJP. majority ruled that a change had occurred in the circum26. 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
27. Id. at 786-87.
28. Id. at 787.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The parties stipulated to the terms of the original divorce decree. Brief for CrossAppellant at 3, J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (No. 15981-2).
32. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 786.
33. Id. at 788.
34. Id. at 786, 788.
35. The mother asserted that the child exhibited "clinging" and insecure behavior
after the visit. She also noticed vaginal swelling after examining the child. Id. at 788.
36. Id. at 788-89.
37. Id. at 789. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.410 (Vernon Supp. 1991) provides in part:
[Tlhe court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless ... it finds, upon the
basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the
court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that the modification is necessary to
serve the best interests of the child.
38. Brief for Cross-Appellant at 8-9,J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(No. 15981-2).
39. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 787.
40. Id.
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stances of the parties, thus allowing modification of the earlier custody
decree because it was in the child's best interests. 4 ' The court first
stated that Missouri had a state interest against the practice of homosex42
uality and in protecting minors from influence by gay men or lesbians.
Noting that Missouri law prohibited deviate sexual intercourse with a
person of the same sex, 4 3 the court concluded that unrestricted visitation with the gay father would threaten the child's physical and emotional welfare. 4 4 It cited holdings establishing that homosexual
relationships are immoral and illicit, and render the parent an unfit custodian. 4 5 Missouri law states that no child may be placed or remain in
the custody of a homosexual parent, and visitation rights must be restricted or terminated.

46

The J.P. majority stated that it need not wait for a child to be
harmed before removing him or her from a gay parent. 4 7 Furthermore,
expert testimony is not necessary for the court to find that the child
would be harmed by exposure to the same-sex relationship. 4 8 The court
noted, however, that there was evidence in JP. that the child was
harmed by the visit. The child's swollen vaginal area indicated there may
have been sexual abuse. 49 The fact that the child's behavior had
41. The court found that the change in the child's behavior, her swollen vaginal area
and the fact that the father and his companion kissed and held hands in the child's presence constituted a sufficient change of circumstances to modify the earlier decree. Id. at
793.
42. Id. at 792 (quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App.
1985)).
43. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090.1 (Vernon 1979). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (upholding a sodomy statute and refusing to grant a fundamental right to consensual homosexual sodomy); Darryl R. Wishard, Note, Out of the Closet and Into the Courts:
Homosexual Fathers and Child Custody, 93 DICK. L. REv. 401, 405 & n.23 (1989) (noting that
approximately half of the states have statutes prohibiting consensual homosexual acts).
44. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 794. See also S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987);J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
45. J.P, 772 S.W.2d at 793. SeeJacobson v.Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981)
(holding that a lesbian woman living with her same-sex companion is not a fit custodian);
Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) ("The father's continuous exposure of the
child to his immoral and illicit [homosexual] relationship renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law.").
46. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793.
47. Id. at 792. See also In re Marriage of P.I.M., 665 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that court need not wait for manifestation of harmful consequences in child
when mother engages in adulterous relationships and smokes marijuana).
48. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793. SeeJL.P.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 869 (holding that court may
determine adverse effect of homosexual father upon child).
49. The court did not explicitly state that the father or Reed had sexually abused the
child. However, it mentioned the child's swollen vaginal area and stated that "sexual
abuse need not be established by direct evidence." J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793. The inference
by the court that the father or Reed sexually abused the daughter is absurd. Even if the
assertion is accepted that homosexual men are more likely to molest children, the Court
overlooked the fact that the child in this case is a female, and presumably is not attractive
to gay men. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. The dissent noted that no
evidence supported the abuse claim. Id. at 795 (Prewitt, J., dissenting). The father's brief
pointed out that the child was in the process of toilet training when the impairment occurred; furthermore, the mother did not call the daughter's physician to testify to the
cause of the injury. Brief for Cross-Appellant at 18,J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (No. 15981-2).
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changed indicated that she may have been emotionally disturbed by the
visitation or the alleged sexual abuse. 50 Because of the likely harm to
the child, the court ruled that the father could have only supervised visitation in the presence of a responsible
adult and no overnight or ex5
tended visits would be permitted. '
TheJ.P. dissent disagreed with the majority's ruling that no homo52
sexual parent should be allowed custody or unrestricted visitation.
Judge Prewitt argued that each custody case should be determined on its
own facts, rather than creating a per se rule of unfitness for gay parents.5" The dissent contended that the trial court had reached a reasonable result in the case and did not abuse its discretion. 54 No proof
indicated the father ever physically abused his daughter or allowed any
abuse to happen. 5 5 Moreover, the evidence failed to show that the child
would suffer emotional harm from visitation with her father. 56 The dissent emphasized that it was important for the child to receive paternal
guidance and love. 5 7 Furthermore, the restrictions imposed by the majority would effectively result in little or no visitation, a result not in the
58
child's best interests.
B.

Nexus of HarmJurisdictions

A majority of states reject the presumption that a homosexual parent is unfit and require that a nexus of harm59 be shown between a parent's sexual orientation and any adverse effect upon the child before
denying custody to a gay parent.6 0 Similarly, the mere fact of a parent's
50. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793 (quoting State v. Burke, 719 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986) ("Common experience teaches us a sexual offense can cause behavioral and
personality changes in the complainant.")).
51. Id. at 794.
52. Id. at 795 (Prewitt, J., dissenting). See G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (Lowenstein, J., dissenting) (arguing that Missouri's irrebuttable presumption
of harm should be abandoned in favor of a rebuttable presumption).
53. JP., 772 S.W.2d at 795 (Prewitt, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 794-95.
55. Id.
56. Id. Cf Shepherd v. Shepherd, 719 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
that restrictions on visitation rights could not be upheld absent evidence that child's stress
was due to visit).
57. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 795 (Prewitt,J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. The first case to explicitly apply the nexus test was Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d
1207 (Mass. 1980). The court held that the mother's sexual orientation was irrelevant to
her fitness as a parent; custody would only be denied if a nexus could be established between the mother's lesbianism and harm to the child. Id. at 1216. See also Barbara A.
Smart, Note, Bezio v. Patenaude: The "Coming Out" Custody Controversy of Lesbian Mothers in
Court, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 331 (1981).
60. See S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985); In re Marriage of Birdsall,
243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 289 (Ct. App. 1988); D.H. v.J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981); Hodson v. Moore, 464 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (awarding joint legal
custody and primary physical custody to lesbian mother); Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So. 2d
321, 324 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (awarding joint custody); Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296
(Mass. App. Ct. 1983); In reJ.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), aff'd,
362 A.2d 54 (App. Div. 1976); M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 969 (Sup. Ct. 1986); A. v.
A., 514 P.2d 358, 360, (Or. Ct. App. 1973); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 705-06
(S.C. Ct. App. 1987); Medeiros v. Medeiros, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2372 (Vt. Super. Ct.
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same-sex orientation is not sufficient to deny visitation to a homosexual
parent; affirmative evidence of harm or likely harm to the child must be
61
shown.
A typical case using the nexus of harm approach is In re Marriage of
Birdsall.6 2 In Birdsall, the California Court of Appeals considered an action to restrict a homosexual father's visitation rights. Greg and Linda
Birdsall separated after eight years of marriage, having had one son during the marriage. 6 3 At the initial hearing to show cause, the parties stipulated to joint legal custody of the child with the mother having physical
custody and the father being granted specific visitation of one weekend
per month and alternating legal holidays. 64 The mother requested a
temporary restraining order to deny the father visitation at his residence because of his acknowledged homosexuality. The father stipu65
lated to this request.
At trial, the parties reiterated that physical custody of the child
would be awarded to the mother, 66 but the issue of visitation was submitted to the court for determination. The father testified that he was
leasing an apartment with two other gay men. He had never engaged in
sexual relations With either of the men, but he was currently in a relationship with a man who visited his home approximately twice a month.
The father testified that he had no intention of raising the child to be
homosexual. 6 7 The mother testified that the child's behavior after previous visitation with the father was rude, insolent and unaffectionate and
that the child was depressed for several days following visits. 68 The trial
court ruled that the father could have visitation consisting of one weekend per month, Monday afternoons, alternate legal holidays and two
weeks during the summer. However, the court ruled that the father was
prohibited from visitation with the child in the presence of a known homosexual. 69 On appeal, the father contended that the trial court erred
in imposing the restrictions. 70 He argued that the evidence was insuffi1982); In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983); Rowsey v.
Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57, 60-61 (W. Va. 1985); see also State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep't, 764
P.2d 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that the homosexuality of child's mother was not
sufficient to deny custody).
61. See Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91; In re Marriage of Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492,
497 (Iowa 1990);J.S. & C., 324 A.2d at 94; DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638
(App. Div. 1978); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 260 S.E.2d 775, 777 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage of Ashling, 599
P.2d 475, 477 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d at 888.
62. 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1988).
63. Id. at 288. In his petition to dissolve the marriage, the father requested joint legal
custody and primary physical custody with visitation rights for the mother. In her response, the mother requested sole legal and physical custody of the child. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The parties also agreed to psychological examinations for themselves and the
child. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The order forbade the father from having overnight visitation "in the presence of any friend, acquaintance or associate who is known to be homosexual." Id.
70. Id.
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cient to support the finding that unrestricted visitation was not in the
71
child's best interests.
The Birdsall court first recognized that California law mandates continuing contact with both parents following a divorce or separation, unless visitation is detrimental to the child's best interests. 72 The court
then addressed the issue of same-sex orientation and its effect on child
custody determinations and noted that courts in California may not determine custody on the basis of sexual orientation alone. 73 The issue of
sexual orientation and visitation rights, however, was a question of first
impression. 74 The court reviewed public policy concerns regarding visitation restrictions by examining cases in another context, noting that
75
restraints on expression of religious views were also invalidated.
Basing its conclusion on the premise that judges' moral values
should not influence decisions, the Birdsall majority ruled that an affirmative showing of harm or likely harm is necessary to restrict parental
visitation. 76 The court reviewed the trial court's conclusions and found
no evidence of detriment to the child. 7 7 No evidence supported the trial
court's finding that the father's sexual practices were indiscreet. 78 The
father's stipulation to restricted visitation could also not be used as evidence that he recognized his lifestyle as harmful to the child. 79 Similarly, the father's statement that he would not raise his child to be
homosexual failed to support an inference that he believed his lifestyle
was harmful to the child.8 0 Because there was no evidence of past or
future harm to the child, the court vacated the portion of the judgment
prohibiting visitation in the presence of any known gay man or
81
lesbian.
71. Id.
72. Id. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600(a) (West 1983) ("[I1t is the public policy of this
state to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents after
the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage, and to encourage parents to share
the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy."). See also In re
Marriage of Matthews, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879, 883 (Ct. App. 1980) ("[Tlhe courts will attempt
to preserve visitation rights whenever possible.") (citation omitted).
73. Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (citing Nadler v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352,
354 (Ct. App. 1967)). However, the court recognized that a parent's sexual orientation
may be considered. Id. (citing Chaffin v. Frye, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (Ct. App. 1975)).
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843 (Ct. App. 1983) and In re
Marriage of Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82 (Ct. App. 1980)).
76. Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
77. Id.
78. Id The trial court concluded that the father's sexual practices had "hardly been
discreet" as evidenced by the fact that "his church membership was terminated due to it."
Id. The court rejected this bald assertion, noting there was no evidence linking the father's
departure from the church with his homosexuality. Id.
79. Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 290 (quoting In re Marriage of Lewin, 231 Cal. Rptr. 433,
436 (Ct. App. 1986) (quoting Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 490 nA (Cal. 1986)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 291. The court stated:
The unconventional lifestyle of one parent, or the opposing moral positions of
the parties, or the outright condemnation of one parent's beliefs by the other
parent's religion, which may result in confusion for the child, do not provide an
adequate basis for restricting visitation rights. Evidence of one parent's homosexuality, without a link to detriment to the child, is insufficient to constitute
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ANALYSIS OF FACTORS USED TO RESTRICT OR DENY GAY PARENTS'
VISITATION RIGHTS

In disputes involving homosexual parents, courts often employ dis82
criminatory generalizations and stereotypes regarding homosexuality
and its effect upon the children, rather than engage in an analysis of the
fitness of the parents and the best interests of the child. One commentator noted, "widespread prejudice and discrimination against homosexuals and lesbian parents, as well as widespread misunderstanding about
these parents, are apparent in child custody decisions to this day, de'8 3
spite studies supporting the suitability of gay individuals as parents."
Gay parents often have parental rights restricted or denied on the basis
of these false assumptions. For example, courts have denied custodial
or visitation rights to gay parents due to the following fears: A child may
become homosexual through exposure to the parent;8 4 a child may be
molested by the gay parent;8 5 a child may be exposed to the AIDS virus; 8 6 a child may be harassed by peers; 8 7 or a child's moral values may
somehow be adversely affected through exposure to homosexuality. 8
These rationales are often the result of judges' lack of current knowledge. These judicial rationales may, however, reflect judicial
homophobia, heterosexism and prejudice. 8 9 One commentator has
characterized these stereotypes as "discriminatory ideologies disguised
as scientific truth to serve as the basis for judicial and statutory activism
in the area of child rearing." 90 Empirical analysis of these judicial preharm. In the absence of any indication of harm, the restraining order is unreasonable and must be vacated.
Id.
82. See generally RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND
LAw 22-27 (1988) (discussion of anti-gay stereotypes and generalizations).
83. Stone, supra note 16, at 739-40.
84. See cases cited infra note 92.
85. See cases cited infra notes 110-11.
86. See cases cited infra notes 116-17.
87. See cases cited infra notes 127-28.
88. See cases cited infra notes 143-44.
89. Homophobia is defined as fear and pathological hatred of individuals sexually oriented toward persons of the same gender. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, Wis. L. REV. 187, 195 (1988). But see BOSWELL, supra note 1, at 46 n. II
(asserting that the derivation of "homophobia" actually suggests the meaning of "fear of
what is similar," rather than "fear of homosexuality."). One commentator asserted that
the bias against gay men and lesbians by the American judiciary merely reflects the
prejudices held by the public. Joshua Dressler,Judicial Homophobia: Gay Rights Biggest Roadblock, 5 Civ. LIBERTIES REV. 19, 22 (1979). Professor Law suggests that the underlying
roots of homophobia are found in societal "heterosexism." Heterosexism embodies
"[t]he pervasive cultural presumption and prescription of heterosexual relationships-and
the corresponding silencing and condemnation of homosexual erotic, familial and communitarian relations ....
" Law, supra at 195. Another author defined heterosexism as "a
world-view, a value system that prizes heterosexuality, assumes it is the only appropriate
manifestation of love and sexuality, and devalues homosexuality and all that is not heterosexual." Gregory M. Herek, The Social Psychology of Homophobia: Toward a PracticalTheor,,
14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 923, 925 (1986). Pervasive heterosexist attitudes, structured into basic societal relationships, may affect judges dealing with gay and lesbian
issues.
90. Polikoff, supra note 2, at 545.
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sumptions reveals no factual or scientific basis to support them. 9 1
Visitation denials based on these assumptions bear no relation to the
child's best interests, and such restrictions will likely harm the child if
they result in deprivation of parental contact. Absent any affirmative
showing that the child will or has been harmed as a result of the parent's
sexual orientation, full visitation rights should be granted to homosexual parents. Outdated myths regarding homosexual parenting must be
discarded to truly serve the best interests of the child.
Courts have based custody and visitation denials on a fear that the
92
child will become homosexual through contact with the gay parent.
These courts rely upon the preconceived assumption that children develop their sexual orientation by modeling themselves after their parents. Courts seek to prevent this by limiting the contact the child has
with the homosexual parent.9 3 This rationale is premised on the belief
that sexual orientation is primarily influenced by environmental, rather
than biological or genetic factors. 94 This assumption is contradicted by
recent research indicating that sexual orientation may be, to a great extent, biologically determined. 95
91. See generally Law, supra note 89 (arguing that negative legal attitudes toward homosexuality are a reaction to the violation of gender norms, rather than scorn for the sexual
practices of gay men and lesbians).
92. See S v. S, 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981);
J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606
S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); In reJ.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 96-97 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1974), aff'd 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Collins v. Collins, No.
87-238-Il, 1988 WL 30173, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988); Dailey v. Dailey, 635
S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
93. "Young people form their sexual identity partly on the basis of models they see in
society. If homosexual behavior is legalized, and thus partly legitimized, an adolescent
may question whether he or she should 'choose' heterosexuality." Collins, 1988 WL 30173
at *6.
94. One court rejected expert testimony that stated that sexual orientation is biologically, not environmentally, influenced by pointing out that the father of the child must
have developed his homosexuality after marriage, because he had previously engaged in
heterosexual relationships.
The father in this case is himself an example of the weakness of the [biological]
theory espoused by the expert witnesses, since the father has engaged in a heterosexual relationship with the mother of this child and produced a child. He has
engaged in heterosexual activity with, admittedly, one other woman since the divorce. He has, during the course of his marriage and subsequent to it, developed
homosexual tendencies....
...Whatever the father's rights may be . . . concerning his own choice of "lifestyle," those rights do not extend to activities designed to induce in a child similar
behavior.
J.L.P(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 868-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis added). This reasoning
ignores the possibility of a bisexual father or suppressed sexual orientation. Instead, the
court relied upon anecdotal evidence and its own presumption to disregard scientific
testimony.
95. A recent study found that a region in the brain that influences sexual behavior is
structurally different in homosexual and heterosexual men. Simon LeVay, A Difference in
Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 Sci. 1034 (1991). Dr.
LeVay, a researcher at the Salk Institute, discovered that certain groups of nerve cells in
the anterior hypothalamus of the brain were more than twice as large in heterosexual men
than in homosexual men or women, suggesting that sexual orientation may be biological
in nature. Id. at 1035. However, Dr. LeVay stated that the study is very preliminary and
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Whether or not one accepts the hypothesis that sexual orientation is
totally or partly biological in nature, a large body of research shows
there is no correlation between a parent's and a child's sexual orientation. Virtually every comparative study of heterosexual and homosexual
parents has found that homosexual parents are no more likely to have
gay children than are heterosexual parents,9 6 and that children develop
their sexual orientation independent from parental influences.9 7 One
study compared fifty lesbian-mother families and forty heterosexualshould not be viewed as conclusive. Id. at 1036. Further research, including a study of
lesbian and heterosexual women's brains, is planned.
Dr. LeVay's findings have sparked a great deal of controversy in both the gay and
heterosexual communities. Robert Bray, spokesperson for the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, stated, " 'Some will say society could 'cure' or 'fix' gays if we just tweak this
chromosome or zap that cell.'" Charlene Crabb, Are Some Men Born to be Homosexual?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. Sept. 9, 1991, at 58. One commentator attacked the research as
impliedly "legitimizing" homosexuality:
Suppose some scientist does find the gene or the section of the brain that "controls" hotheadedness? Does that mean that we should cease urging hotheads to
calm down? Does that mean that we must regard hotheadedness as morally
equivalent to even-temperedness? No. We are all born with countless innate tendencies - to violence, to sloth, to selfishness - that we are socialized to control.
Mona Charen, Copping Out: 'MyBrain Made Me Do It', NEWSDAY, Sept. 4, 1991, at 86. One
person attacked the study as biased: "[Dr. LeVayl is a professed gay who would have, I
think, every reason to want to find some kind of finding as he is now reaching out for, but I
would simply say that as a Christian minister, we look on homosexuality as we do any sin
.... Jerry. Falwell, on Nightline: Is Homosexuality Biological? (ABC television broadcast, Aug.
30, 1991).
Another recent study also concluded that sexual orientation is biologically determined. Professors Michael Bailey and Richard Pillard studied the rate of homosexuality in
identical and fraternal twin and adoptive brothers. They found that 52% of the identical
twin brothers were gay, 22% of the non-identical twin brothers were gay, and only 11% of
the adoptive brothers were gay. Michael Bailey & Richard Pillard, Are Some People Born
Gay?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1991, at A21. See also Neil Buhrich et al., Sexual Orientation,
Sexual Identity, and Sex-Dimorphic Behaviors in Male Twins, 21 BEHAV. GENETICS 75 (1991)
(finding significantly higher rate of homosexuality in identical twin brothers than in fraternal twins). But see Elke D. Eckert et al., Homosexuality in Monozygotic Twins Reared Apart, 148
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 421 (1986) (study suggested that female homosexuality may be an
acquired trait, but genes may play some part in male homosexuality).
96. See Susan Golombok et al., Children inLesbian and Single-ParentHouseholds: Psychosexual and PsychiatricAppraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 551, 562-63 (1983) (find-

ing no difference between children raised in lesbian or heterosexual single parent
households and concluding that rearing a child in a lesbian household did not lead to
atypical psychosexual development); Richard Green et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparison with Solo Parent Heterosexual Mothers and Their Children, 15 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 167, 179-83 (1986) (same); Richard Green, Sexual Identity of37 Children Raised by

Homosexual or Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692, 696 (1978) (finding typical
psychosexual development in children raised by lesbian or transsexual parent); Martha
Kirkpatrick et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparative Survey, 51 AM.]. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545, 551 (1981) (reporting no difference in gender identity development in
children studied); Brian Miller, Gay Fathers and Their Children, 28 FAM. COORDINATOR 544,
551 (1979) (concluding that gay fathers do not have a higher percentage of gay children
than heterosexual fathers). See generally David Cramer, Gay Parents and Their Children: A Review of Research and PracticalImplications, 64 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 504, 504-05 (1986) (re-

viewing studies of sex role development of children raised by a homosexual or lesbian
parent).
97. Homosexual men and women are raised predominantly in heterosexual couples,
thus disputing the notion that parental influence is the primary factor in sexual identity
development. Donna J. Hutchens & Martha J.Kirkpatrick, Lesbian Mothers/Gay Fathers, in
EMERGING ISSUES IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 115, 121 (Diane H. Schetky & Elissa
P. Benedek eds., 1985).
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mother families and found no significant differences in the sexual identity of the children studied. 9 8 The authors stated, "boys and girls raised
from early childhood by a homosexual mother without an adult male in
the household for about 4 years do not appear appreciably different on
parameters of psychosexual and psychosocial development from children raised by heterosexual mothers, also without an adult male present." 9 9 A denial of visitation rights based upon the premise of a child's
emulation of the parent's sexual orientation

scientific

knowledge

and

can

only

simply ignores current

reflect judicial

prejudice

and

homophobia.
Even if it is assumed arguendo that sexual orientation is learned or
chosen behavior and not biologically determined, the underlying premise is that being gay is inherently harmful and not in the best interests of
the child.' 0 0 This reflects the common prejudice that gay men and lesbians are psychologically maladjusted' 0 1 and unhappier' 0 2 than the het-

erosexual population.
mental illness.103

Indeed, many still view homosexuality as a

This conclusion, however, is not accepted by the sci-

entific community nor supported by research.'

0 4

The American Psychi-

atric Association no longer regards homosexuality as a mental disorder
or sexual deviation 10 5 and announced this resolution: "The sex, gender
identity, or sexual orientation of natural or prospective adoptive or foster parents should not be the sole or primary variable considered in custody or placement cases."' 1 6 Research has shown that homosexual men
and women are no more unstable, immature, or unhappy than comparable groups of heterosexuals.' 0 7 Indeed, several studies have found that
lesbians may be emotionally more well-adjusted than heterosexual women.10 8 A judicial presumption based on the mental instability of gay
98. Green et al., supra note 96, at 179-82.
99. Id. at 182.
100. Note, supra note 14, at 1639.
101. Hutchens & Kirkpatrick, supra note 97, at 117.
102. Note, supra note 14, at 1639.
103. See Susoeff, supra note 7, at 870 & n.120 ("[T]he judiciary has been slow to recognize that homosexuality is no longer regarded as a mental or emotional illness.").
104. See Susoeff, supra note 7, at 870-74 (reviewing research regarding same-sex orientation and mental illness).
105. "In December 1973, the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association voted to eliminate homosexuality per se as a mental disorder ....
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 380 (3d
ed. 1980). See also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 296 (3d ed. rev. 1987).

106. John J. Conger, Proceedings of the American Psychological Association Incorporated,for the
Year 1946: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Counsel of Representatives, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
408, 432 (1977).
107.

See ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF HUMAN

DIVERSITY (1978); Marcie R. Adelman, Comparison of ProfessionallyEmployed Lesbians and He!erosexual Women in the MMPI, 6 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 193 (1977); Marvin Siegelman,
Adjustment of Male Homosexuals and Heterosexuals, 2 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 9 (1972); Nor-

man L. Thompson et al., PersonalAdjustment of Male and Female Homosexuals and Heterosexuals,
78J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 237 (1971). See generally Law, supra note 89, at 202-06, 212-14.

108. See Andrea K. Oberstone & Harriet Sukoneck, Psychological Adjustment and Lifest'les
of Single Lesbians and Single Heterosexual Women, I PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 172 (1979) (finding that
lesbian women were more satisfied in their relationships than heterosexual women); Mar-
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men and lesbians is contradicted by a significant body of reseach and
cannot logically justify visitation restrictions. 109
Courts have denied custody or visitation to homosexual parents because of the fear that the parent or the parent's friends may sexually
molest the child.' 10 A good example of the judicial reluctance to abandon this stereotype is the statement injL.P.(H.) v. D.J.P.: "Every trial
judge, or for that matter, every appellate judge, knows that the molestation of minor boys by adult males is not as uncommon as the psychological experts' testimony indicated." ''
This rationale is usually raised
only in cases involving a gay father, thus perpetuating the myth that gay
men are attracted to and may take advantage of children. 1 2 There is no
scientific evidence to support this view. Research shows that almost all
child abusers are heterosexual men."13 Visitation restrictions based
upon the supposed inclination of gay men to "prey" on young boys are
not supported by scientific knowledge and embody judicial heterosex1 14
ism and homophobia.
The issue of the child's possible exposure to the Human Immuvin Siegelman, Adjustment of Homosexual and Heterosexual Vomen, 120 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 477

(1972) (noting that lesbians were better adjusted than heterosexual women in certain
areas).
109. Some courts recognize this point. For example, one court stated, "homosexuality
is not a 'disease,' and it is not, in and of itself, a mental disorder." Baker v. Wade, 553 F.
Supp. 1121, 1129 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). The court added, "homosexuality in society does not adversely affect the growth and development of children." Id. at 1131.
110. See Newsome v. Newsome, 256 S.E.2d 849, 851 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); In reJ.S. &
C., 324 A.2d 90, 96-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (quoting expert testimony, "'it is
possible that these children upon reaching puberty would be subject to either overt or
covert homosexual seduction ......."),
aff'd, 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
111. 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). Judge Dixon continued:
A few minutes research discloses the following [seven] appellate decisions involving such molestation. It may be that numerically instances of molestation occur
with more frequency between heterosexual males and female children, but given
the statistical incidence of homosexuality in the population, which the father
claims is 5 to 10%, homosexual molestation is probably, on an absolute basis,
more prevalent.
Id. (citations omitted). This analysis would be almost comical, if not for the tragic consequences of such flawed reasoning. Thejudge ignored uncontradicted expert evidence and
instead based his conclusion on the existence of seven cases involving child molestation by
gay men, thus illustrating some judges' absolute refusal to acknowledge empirical data
that rebuts long-held assumptions. One commentator pointed out that the generalization
concerning the alleged predilection of gay men toward child abuse is perpetuated by
judges' tendency to take "tacit" or "unconscious" judicial notice of this false stereotype.
Susoeff, supra note 7, at 880.
112.

See cases cited supra note 111. One student Note pointd out that because women,

either lesbian or heterosexual, rarely molest children, "[i]f courts were making custody
decisions based solely on the risk of molestation, therefore, they would award custody to
the mother, whether or not she were a lesbian." Note, supra note 14, at 1640.
113.

See ROBERT L. GEISER, HIDDEN VICTIMS:

THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 75

(1979); Marny Hall, Lesbian Families: Cultural and Clinical Issues, 23 Soc. WORK 380, 383
(1978) (noting that child abuse is disproportionately heterosexual in nature); Miller, supra
note 96, at 546 (same). See generally Susoeff, supra note 7, at 880-81 & nn.183-86 (reviewing
research showing that homosexual men are unlikely to be child molesters).
114. At least one court has recognized that this generalization is unfounded. "The vast
majority of sex crimes committed by adults upon children are heterosexual, not homosexual. Homosexuals do not have a criminal propensity simply because they are homosexuals, any more than heterosexuals do." Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1130-31 (N.D.
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nodeficiency Virus (HIV) 115 from a homosexual parent has arisen in several states and may become a significant factor as the disease spreads.' 16
Despite greater public awareness about AIDS, many parents may oppose
visitation by gay parents because of the fear that the child will contract
the virus through contact with that parent, even though the parent may
not be HIV-positive. 11 7 Two separate issues are raised by the AIDS virus in regard to visitation. First, should visitation be denied solely on
the assumption that a homosexual parent is more likely to contract HIV
than a heterosexual parent? Second, should visitation be restricted or
denied when a parent is actually HIV infected?
The mere possibility of HIV infection from a homosexual parent cannot logically be used to deny or restrict visitation with a child. The assumption that gay parents are more likely than heterosexual parents to
contract AIDS is not logically or scientifically justified. First, AIDS can
no longer be thought of as exclusively a gay disease. Because the disease has spread to the heterosexual population as well as the homosexual population, the possibility exists that either gay or heterosexual
parents may be HIV infected.' 18 Moreover, if a court bases custodial
decisions on the statistical probability of HIV infection, then lesbian
mothers should never be denied parental rights, because lesbians have
the lowest rate of AIDS and HIV infection of all demographic groups.l" 9
The second issue-whether courts are justified in denying visitation
Tex. 1982) (footnote omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
115. HIV is the virus that causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
AIDS is the final, invariably fatal stage of the immune system deterioration caused by the
HIV virus. The virus impairs the human body's immune system, rendering a person vulnerable to various infections and diseases. An individual can also become sick and die of
AIDS Related Complex (ARC) without progressing to AIDS. Edward P. Richards, Communicable Disease Control in Colorado: A Rational Approach to AIDS, 65 DENv. U. L. REV. 127, 127
n.3 (1988). HIV is transmitted by three methods: sexual intercourse, sharing contaminated syringes and blood or blood-product transfusions. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha
A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139, 141 (1988).
116. See Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Doe v. Roe, 526
N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1988); "Jane" W. v. "John" W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. 1987);
Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
117. See, e.g.,J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 788-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
118. While any statistical breakdown is necessarily imprecise, current numbers indicate
that approximately 23% of reported AIDS cases involved heterosexual men and women.
Apparently, 19% of those contracted the virus through intravenous drug abuse, while the
other 4% were exposed to the virus through heterosexual intercourse. CENTER FOR DIsEASE CONTROL, WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REP. (June 6, 1988), quoted in Larry Gostin, The Poli-

tics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017,
1018 n.5 (1989). See also James W. Curran et al., The Epidemiology of AIDS. Current Status and
Future Prospects, 229 Sci. 1352 (1985). The incidence of heterosexual cases will likely increase if effective programs to reduce transmission through the use of contaminated syringes are not implemented. Homosexual transmission of AIDS may decrease due to
changed gay sexual practices adopted in response to the threat of the disease. John L.
Martin, The Impact of AIDS on Gay Male Sexual Behavior Patterns in New York City, 77 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 578, 580 (1987).

119. Law, supra note 89, at 195. Professor Law noted that "AIDS poses no risk to gay
men in relationships that are affectionate but not sexual, or to monogamous, uninfected
gay couples." Id. See also Mark S. Senak, The Lesbian and Gay Community, in AIDS AND TlE
Law 290, 292 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987).
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based on a parent's actual HIV infection-is more troublesome.12 0
Judges understandably wish to protect the child's best interests by minimizing the inadvertent risk of HIV transmission from the parent. This
concern is unfounded, however, because current research shows the
AIDS virus cannot be transmitted through casual contact.' 2 ' No documented cases of HIV transmission through casual contact exist-not
even while a household is shared with an infected person.12 2 Common
household practices such as sharing silverware and towels with an HIV
infected person do not present any risk of contracting HIV. 12 3 One
court acknowedged that casual transmission of HIV is highly unlikely
and stated, "[tihe overwhelming weight and consensus of medical opinion is clear; the HIV virus is not spread casually."' 124 Several courts
have addressed the issue of visitation rights when a parent is HIV infected and have ruled that parental rights cannot be terminated solely
on the basis of parental HIV infection. 12 5 HIV infection alone should
not be used as the sole basis for denial of visitation or custody, because
the medical risk to the child is virtually nonexistent and greater harm
12 6
may result to the child from parental deprivation.
Denial of custody or visitation has been based on a fear that the
child may be harassed or subject to community prejudice because of the
parent's homosexuality. 12 7 One court stated that it was compelled "to
120. See cases cited supra note 116.
121. See Gerald H. Friedland et al., Lack of Transmission of HTLV/L4V-III Infection to
Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314 NEW
ENG. J. MEDICINE 344, 348 (1986) (study indicating that household members who have no
sexual contact with AIDS carriers are at minimal risk). See generally Nancy B. Mahon, Note,
Public Hysteria, Private Conflict: Child Custody and Visitation Disputes Involving an HIV Infected
Parent, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1092, 1101-02 (1988) (reviewing studies).
122. See Margaret A. Fischl et al., Evaluation of Heterosexual Partners, Children, and Household Contacts of Adults with AIDS, 257 J.A.M.A. 640, 644 (1987) ("Of 90 HTLV-III/LAVseronegative children at entry into the study, there was no evidence of horizontal transmission.... These observations are important and suggest that contact in other settings (for
example, schools) is not likely to transmit HTLV-III/LAV.").
123. Id. at 642.
124. Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 719, 725 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
125. See Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (visitation could
not be terminated because of father's AIDS infection); Doe, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 726 (father's
AIDS would not justify removal of child from his custody); "Jane" W. v. 'John" W., 519
N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (visitation could not be terminated because of father's
AIDS); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (court stated that
only minimal risk of exposure existed even if father had tested positively for the virus).
126. See Mahon, supra note 121, at 1138-41 (arguing that denial of custody or visitation
because of parent's HIV infection ignores medical knowledge about the disease and endangers the child's psychological development). But see Amy R. Pearce, Note, Visitation
Rights of an AIDS Infected Parent, 27J. FAM. L. 715, 731 (1988-89) (suggesting that visitation
precautions or supervised visitation with an HIV infected parent is appropriate to protect
the child).
127. See L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);Jacobson v.Jacobson, 314
N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) ("[W]e cannot lightly dismiss the fact that living in the same
house with their mother and her lover may well cause the children to 'suffer from the
slings and arrows of a disapproving society' ....
); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969
(Okla. 1982); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) ("[Wle have no hesitancy in
saying that the conditions under which this child must live.., impose an intolerable burden upon her by reason of the social condemnation attached to them, which will inevitably
afflict her relationships with her peers and with the community at large.").
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protect the children from peer pressure, teasing, and possible ostracizing" resulting from the mother's homosexuality. 12 8 The possibility of
societal homophobia, however, is not sufficient to justify the abridgment
of parental rights. First, courts should not assume that such social pressures inevitably exist when a parent is homosexual. ' 29 Such logic inherently presumes that gay parents openly display their sexual orientation,
thus subjecting the child to ridicule and taunting.' 3 0 Homosexual parents, however, can be as discreet as heterosexual parents regarding sexual and familial issues. Moreover, even if the child is subjected to
prejudice and ridicule from peers, courts should not assume that this
harassment will necessarily harm the child.13 1 Available research indicates that children are often able to withstand peer pressure regarding
their parent's homosexuality.' 3 2 Indeed, children are frequently
taunted by peers for reasons unrelated to their parents' sexuality. The
possibility of this harassment does not justify visitation restrictions or
termination of parental rights.' 3 3 Furthermore, courts should recognize
128. S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
129. See Susoeff, supra note 7, at 877 & n.158 (citing research showing that only about
five percent of children living with an openly gay parent had been harassed by other
children).
130. See Robert G. Bagnall et al., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court
System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
497, 532 n.147 (1984) ("The stigma rationale rests in part on the untested assumption that
children have extensive knowledge of the lifestyles of their playmates' and schoolmates'
parents.").
131. One court has recognized that the child's moral values may actually be strengthened by standing up to prejudice. M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979) ("It is ... reasonable to expect that they will emerge better equipped to search
out their own standards of right and wrong, [and] better able to perceive that the majority
is not always correct in its moral judgments .... ").
132. One study reported that no significant differences were found in peer group relationships between children of homosexual and heterosexual parents.
Eighty percent of the daughters of lesbian mothers and 75% of the heterosexuals'
daughters said that they were liked "much more," "somewhat more," or "as
much" by their same-sex peer group as other girls in their class. More than 80%
of the sons of lesbian mothers and of the heterosexual mothers reported corresponding self-ratings of popularity with their male classmates. . . . The lesbian
mothers rated 90% of their daughters and 96% of their sons as leaders or good
mixers, compared to the heterosexuals' ratings of 92% for their daughters and
85% for their sons.
Green et al., supra note 96, at 178. Another study found that a majority of children of
lesbian mothers were not conscious of any societal prejudice against their mothers. The
children who were aware of the prejudice supported their mothers and rejected stereotypes. "[T]he majority of children combine any embarassment of initial uncomfortableness with an understanding that society has created the prejudice; that it is society, and not
their mothers, that should re-examine its position." Lonnie G. Nungesser, Theoretical Bases
for Research on the Acquisition of Social-Sex Roles by Children of Lesbian Mothers, 5J. HOMOSEXUALrrv 177, 184 (1980) (quoting Barbara S. Bryant, Lesbian Mothers 73A (1975) (unpublished manuscript, on file at Lymar Associates, 330 Ellis St., Room 401, San Francisco,
Cal.). See generally Polikoff, supra note 2, at 561-66 (reviewing research showing that children of homosexual parents are psychologically well-adjusted).
133. "Children whose families are in some way different froin the norm may have to
confront distressing reactions from others. These differences can include, among other
things, the family's ethnic traits and practices, race, religious affiliation, the parent's country of origin, physical appearance, or occupation." Polikoff, supra note 2, at 567-68. Professor Polikoff also noted, "it is unwarranted to assume that . . . harassment based on a
parent's sexual orientation will be more troubling than harassment based on other reasons." Id. at 569.
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that the child may be subject to harassment by peers merely because the
parent is homosexual.' 3 4 Reducing contact with the gay parent would
3 5
have no effect on the possibility of peer pressure and prejudice.'
Even if the possibility of harassment is acknowledged, courts may
not give judicial effect to this form of societal prejudice or stigmatization. In Palmore v. Sidoti, 13 6 the Supreme Court ruled that a mother
could not be denied custody of her child because community prejudice
could result following her interracial remarriage.' 3 7 The Court acknowledged: "There is a risk that a child living with a step-parent of a
different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not
present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic
origin."' 3 8 The Court recognized that custody determinations based on
the best interests of the child are a substantial governmental interest,
but ruled that the denial of custody based upon the effects of racial prejudice was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' 3 9 The Court
stated, "[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither
can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."140 Although
Palmore involved potential racial discrimination, the principle applies
equally to discrimination based on sexual orientation. 14 1 One court re134. One court acknowleged this fact and stated:
[T]he children's exposure to embarrassment is not dependent upon the identity
of the parent with whom they happen to reside. Their discomfiture, if any, comes
about not because of living with defendant, but because she is their mother, because she is a lesbian, and because the community will not accept her.
M.P., 404 A.2d at 1262. See also Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of
Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BuFF. L. REV. 691, 730-31 (1976)
("[I1f the mother is known in the community as a lesbian, counsel can point out that the
children may be harassed, if at all, regardless of with whom they live.").
135. See M.P., 404 A.2d at 1262 ("Neither the prejudices of the small community in
which they live nor the curiosity of their peers about defendant's sexual nature will be
abated by a change of custody."). See also Donna Hitchens & Barbara Price, Trial Strategy in
Lesbian Mother Custody Cases: The Use of Expert Testimony, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 451, 469
(1978-1979) ("Denying custody does not eliminate the mother's lesbianism. The child still
has a lesbian mother and possibly faces a greater stigmatization as a result of having a
mother who is considered so immoral or dangerous that she is denied the custody of her
children."). M.P. involved an action for change of custody, but the argument used in a
visitation context is even stronger. Limiting visitation with a homosexual parent to spare
the child harassment or embarrassment will not affect existing community prejudice, and
may threaten the child's best interests by decreasing necessary contact with the noncustodial parent. See infra part IV.
136. 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (unanimous decision).
137. Id. at 434. The father of the child sought to modify the earlier decree granting
custody to the mother. He based his petition on changed conditions; the change was that
the mother, a Caucasian, was living with and later married an African-American man. Id.
at 430. The trial court, in an unpublished opinion, ruled that the child's best interests
would be served by changing custody to the father and stated, "it is inevitable that Melanie
will, if allowed to remain in her present situation and attains school age and thus more
vulnerable to peer pressures, suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure to come."
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431 (1984) (quoting from Application to Petition for
Certiorari at 26-27).
138. Id. at 433.
139. Id. at 433-34.
140. Id. at 433.
141. For discussions of homosexual individuals as a class entitled to heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause, see Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the
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lied on Palmore to deny a father's motion for change of custody based on
the mother's homosexuality.14 2 It follows that judicially imposed visitation denials are similarly invalid, if premised on the possibility of discrimination or prejudice resulting from a parent's sexual orientation.
Courts often deny custody or restrict visitation because of the supposed danger to the child's morals from exposure to the parent's homosexuality.' 4 3 Illustrative is the statement by the court in S.E.G. v. R.A.G.:
"Such [homosexual] conduct can never be kept private enough to be a
neutral factor in the development of a child's values and character. We
will not ignore such conduct by a parent which may have an effect on the
children's moral development."' 144 To be sure, the promotion of a
child's moral development is a legitimate parental concern. However, it
is impermissible for a court to impose majoritarian standards of morality
on families. 1 45 Given the subjective nature of morality, it is difficult
even to determine what prevailing standards of morality exist in a community. 146 Courts often point to state laws forbidding consensual sodomy as evidence of community standards condemning homosexuality as
immoral.14 7 The existence of these laws, however, does not support the
premise that homosexuality is immoral. 1 4 8 The majority of these statApplication of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classification Based on Homosexuality, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 797 (1984); Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as
a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985). For discussions of custody decisions
and equal protection, see David S. Dooley, Comment, Immoral Because They're Bad, Bad Because They're Wrong: Sexual Orientation and Presumptionsof Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes,
26 CAL. W. L. REV. 395 (1990); Note, supra note 15.
142. See S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985). The court stated, "Simply
put, it is impermissible to rely on any real or imagined social stigma attaching to Mother's
status as a lesbian." Id. But see S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that Palmore does not apply to custody disputes involving homosexual parents).
143. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987); L. v. D.,
630 S.W.2d 240, 243-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 10
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985).
144. 735 S.W.2d at 166.
145. See generally Katheryn D. Katz, MajoritarianMorality and ParentalRights, 52 ALB. L.
REv. 405 (1988) (arguing that fundamental parental rights should not be abridged because
of community standards).
146. Religious doctrine may be invoked to establish that a community disapproves of
homosexuality. Professor Polikoff noted, however, that "contemporary mainstream religious thought does not uniformly hold that homosexuality is immoral." Polikoff, supra
note 2, at 550. Polikoff further pointd out that biblical references to homosexuality are
open to interpretation: "Diversity of biblical interpretation defies the concept of a universally held religious conviction that homosexuality is immoral." Id. at 549.
147. See, e.g., Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d at 514 (Cracraft,J., concurring) ("The people of this
state have declared, through legislative action, that sodomy is immoral, unacceptable, and
criminal conduct."). For an example of a sodomy statute that specifically prohibits only
same-sex contact, see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.190 (Michie 1986) ("[Elvery person of

full age who commits the infamous crime against nature shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than 1 year nor more than 6 years .... The 'infamous
crime against nature' means anal intercourse, cunnilingus or fellatio between consenting
adults of the same sex."). In 1986, the Supreme Court held that the enforcement of sodomy statutes did not violate the Due Process Clause because there is no right of privacy for
acts of consensual homosexual sodomy. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
148. Sexual conduct alone is not determinative of morality. Professor Katz notes that,
"There are moral choices other than sexual behavior. The decision to nurture, care for
and protect one's child is also a moral choice, a choice entitled to encouragement and
support." Katz, supra note 145, at 468-69 (footnote omitted).
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utes do not specifically prohibit only homosexual sodomy, but rather
prohibit all heterosexual and homosexual consensual sodomy. 149 One
commentator noted, "[i]n those states that have sodomy statutes,
neither the derivation nor the language of the statutes reflects a belief in
the immorality of homosexuality. This is because sodomy and homosexuality cannot be equated."' 5 0
Even if a court is able to determine that
sodomy statutes are indicative of community standards condemning homosexuality as immoral, these standards do not justify visitation denials
to gay parents. First, courts cannot presume that all homosexual parents engage in the prohibited sexual conduct. A significant percentage
of gay parents do not engage in any form of sodomy. 15 ' A denial of
parental rights, without any affirmative evidence that the gay parent has
violated the sodomy law, is illogical and prejudicial. 15 2 Moreover, even
if the sodomy law has been violated by the gay parent and is affirmatively
proved, this breach does not render the parent immoral. The existence
of a law does not necessarily mean that the infringement of that law is
immoral. Laws against slavery and racial intermarriage are but two examples of laws that were immoral in themselves; violating these laws was
53
not an immoral act and did not confer immorality upon the violators.1
Furthermore, courts act selectively and prejudicially to focus on violations of sodomy laws by gay parents, while ignoring the violation of laws
by heterosexual parents. 154 Denying a child parental visitation because
149. See Note, supra note 15, at 1520 (noting that, of the 25 jurisdictions that have
sodomy laws, only seven specifically prohibit homosexual sodomy).
150. Polikoff, supra note 2, at 551.
151. See Note, supra note 15, at 635 (citing studies showing that many lesbians and gay
men do not engage in sodomy). See also Martin, supra note 118, at 580.
152. Courts' homophobia and heterosexism is expressed when this reasoning is used
to deny custody or visitation to gay parents. The majority of sodomy statutes apply to both
homosexuals and heterosexuals, yet courts do not automatically assume that all heterosexuals engage in sodomy, without affirmative evidence.
153. See Polikoff, supra note 2, at 553 ("[T]he criminal law does not provide proof of
morality or immorality, but instead expresses dominant values designed to preserve a particular social order."). One author noted that social mores do not confer morality on laws:
Sometimes by "morality" is meant the overall beliefs affecting behavior in a society-its current mores, norms, and customs. On this understanding, gays certainly are not moral: lots of people hate them and social customs are designed to
register widespread disapproval of gays. The problem here is that this sense of
morality is merely a descriptive one. On this understanding of what morality is,
every society has a morality--even Nazi society, which had racism and mob rule as
central features of its popular "morality." What is needed in order to use the
notion of morality to praise or condemn behavior is a sense of morality that is
prescriptive or normative ....

Moral thinking that carries a prescriptive or normative force has certain basic
ground rules to which all people consent when attention is drawn to them. First,
normative moral beliefs are not merely expressions of feelings. Rather we ...are
expected to be able to give reasons or justifications for them .... Second, moral
thinking must be consistent and fair . . . . Third, we must avoid prejudice and
rationalization ....

MOHR, supra note 82, at 31.
154. One commentator noted,
The judiciary's concern with public policy and its concomitant fear of "condoning" illicit and immoral behavior seems highly selective, given the wide range
of immoral behavior, (some of it even criminal) in which most parents engage at
one time or another. The depth of the hatred and irrationality of the condemnation evoked by the sexual practices of parents, for example, is in sharp contrast to
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of the gay parent's "immoral" violation of sodomy laws ignores the
child's best interests. The morality or immorality of the homosexual
parent's sexual practices is irrelevant to the child's need for parental
55
care and guidance.1
IV.

ANALYSIS OF EFFECT ON CHILDREN FROM LACK OF VISITATION

Parental separation and divorce are invariably traumatic for the children involved. After a divorce, the child experiences feelings of grief,
fear, guilt and rejection.1 5 6 One study noted, "[w]hatever its shortcomings, the family is perceived by the child at this time as having provided
the support and protection he needs. The divorce signifies the collapse
of that structure, and he feels alone and very frightened."' 157 When
courts restrict visitation because of a parent's sexual orientation, the
trauma may be exacerbated by the subsequent denial of parental contact. Courts should recognize the psychological implications on the
child from deprivation of parent-child contact, and deny visitation with a
gay noncustodial parent only when a clear nexus of harm to the child
exists. 158
A large body of psychological research shows that the noncustodial
parent's visitation is vital to the child. The most extensive study of children of divorce was conducted by Wallerstein and Kelly and involved an
examination of sixty families over a five-year period. 159 The authors
found that soon after the divorce "children expressed the wish for increased contact with their fathers with a startling and moving intensity.
...Complaints about insufficiency of parental visits were heard not just
from those youngsters who rarely saw the absent parent, but from many
who were being visited rather frequently as well."' 60 In the year following the divorce, only twenty percent of the children were reasonably
content with their individual visiting situations. 16 ' Wallerstein and
the legislative and judicial condonation of abusive physical behavior toward
spouses and children by their rejecting or ignoring it as a factor in custody and
visitation decisions.
Katz, supra note 145, at 461.
155. See Note, supra note 15, at 635 ("Surely, assuming the child is not present during
the sexual activity, the difference between the child's parent receiving sexual gratification
through oral or manual stimulation will not affect the child's well-being.").

156. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP-How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 35-50 (1980).
157. Id. at 35.
158. See Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) ("If the courts
are concerned with the best interests of the child, then visitation by the non-custodial
parent must be recognized as necessary to the child's well-being.").
159. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 156, at 134. Wallerstein conducted a ten year
follow-up study and found that the conclusions made in the book were still valid. See
Judith S. Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: Preliminary Report of a Ten-Year Follow-Up of Young
Children, 54 Am.J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 444 (1984). But see Carol S. Bruch, ParentingAt and
After Divorce: A Search for New Models, 79 MICH. L. REV. 708, 708 (1981) (reviewingJuDITH
S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP-How CHILDREN AND PARENTS

COPE WITH DIVORCE 35-50 (1980) (suggesting that Wallerstein and Kelly's research should
be viewed as suggestive and not conclusive)).
160. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 156, at 134.
161. Id. at 143. The authors found that nearly 40% of the children who were visited by
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Kelly examined the same children five years after the divorce and discovered that thirty-four percent of the children had adjusted successfully to
62
the divorce. 1
Regular and frequent visitation was found to be an important factor
in the children's psychological health. 163 Twenty-nine percent of the
children were classified as exhibiting "adequate and uneven functioning."' 164 The authors classified a third group of children as extremely
unhappy and dissatisfied with their lives.1 65 The study revealed that lack
166
of visitation played a large role in the children's maladjustment.
Children who were not visited by the noncustodial parent felt rejected
and unloved, 16 7 suffered severe psychological damage' 68 and exper69
ienced difficulties in school.1
Other studies show that visitation by the noncustodial parent is important to a child's psychological adjustment. 170 One study found that
the noncustodial parent experienced feelings of intense excitement and eagerness for the
visit to occur. Id. Not surprisingly, "[d]isappointment was most intense when the visits
were, in fact, few and far between or when a father failed to keep a scheduled appointment." Id. at 144. However, the authors found that reluctance to visit occurred in 11% of
the children studied, mostly preadolescent girls. Id. at 146.
162. Id. at 209. The authors found that these children had high self-esteem and were
coping well with the tasks of school and home. Id.
163. Id. at 219. The authors noted that "[tihe trio of good father-child relationship,
high self-esteem, and absence of depression appeared.., to hold for all age groups." Id.
164. Id. at 212-13. No data was given for this group on the effect of visitation upon the
children. The children were considered uneven in their overall ego functioning; teachers
considered the children average.
165. Id. at 211. Over one-third of the children studied fit into this group five years
after the separation. These children were found to be moderately to severely depressed,
and emotionally needy. Id.
166. Id. at 248.
167. Id. at 218. "The negative effect of irregular, erratic visiting was clear. The father's abandonment, relative absence, infrequent or irregular appearance, or general unreliability, which disappointed the child repeatedly, usually led the child to feel rejected or
rebuffed and lowered the child's self-esteem." Id.
168. Id. at 248.
169. Id. at 283. One pair of authors, relying heavily on Wallerstein and Kelly's data,
proposed that the noncustodial parent's visitation with the child be enforced by law following separation prior to the divorce.
We propose that where one parent serves as the primary, day-to-day caretaker of
the child, minimum standards of child visitation and child support be established
by law, to go into effect immediately upon the separation of the parents. For
either parent to fail to abide by at least the minimum standards of support and
visitation, without court approval, would be a violation of the law.
Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Paul C. Vitz, Child Protective Divorce Laws: A Response to the Effects of
ParentalSeparation on Children, 27 FAM. L.Q. 327, 356-57 (1983).
170. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 232-40 (1989) (study showed that a strong
father-son relationship following a divorce was crucial to the overall psychological adjustment of the children); William F. Hodges, The Effect of Divorce on Children: Developmental
Stages and Implications for V/isitation, in CHILD CUSTODY CONFERENCE: VISITATION-FROM
CHAOS TO COOPERATION 30, 39 (1982) (reviewing research suggesting that the greater the

time lost with the father as a function of divorce, the greater the maladjustment of the
child); Gerald F. Jacobson & Doris S. Jacobson, Impact of larital Dissolution on Adults and
Children: The Significance of Loss and Continuity, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEPARATION AND Loss

316, 329-31 (Jonathon Bloom-Feshbach et al., eds., 1987) (reviewing research on visitation and its effect on children). But see James H. Bray & Sandra H. Berger, Noncustodial
Father and Paternal Grandparent Relationships in Stepfamilies, 39 FAM. REL. 414, 418 (1990)
(study found conflicting data regarding the effect of frequent visitation by the non-custo-

1992]

STIGMATIZATION AND DISCRIMINATION

children exhibited severe "distress symptoms" following withdrawal of
visitation by the noncustodial parent.17 1 One researcher conducted indepth interviews with forty children and teenagers who had experienced
a divorce and found that children preferred flexible and unrestricted visitation arrangements. 1 72 The author stated, "[t]he children who were
more content were those who maintained contact with the non-custodial
parent on a continuous and flexible basis ....
Our findings repeatedly
single out the significance that children attach to maintaining relations
73
with [noncustodial] fathers."l
Another study suggested that denial of visitation imposed by the
custodial parent may hinder children's psychological health. The author
commented, "[w]hen mothers had cut off fathers from parenting, it was
reflected in children's poorer adjustment in the home."' 174 Another researcher reported that, "visitation patterns of low frequency . . . and
inconsistency are predictive of maladjustment in the child.... [B]ecause
of the relationship of consistency of visitation to child adjustment,
courts and parents might attempt as much as possible to provide
17 5
predictible patterns of visitation for the preschool child."'
Lack of visitation with the noncustodial parent may have a detrimental effect on a child's psychological and social functioning. Courts
should take these factors into account when analyzing parental fitness
and sexual orientation. The child's best interests are served by requiring a showing of direct harm from a parent's homosexuality before imposing visitation restrictions or denying visitation with the child
altogether.
CONCLUSION

Traditionally, gay parents have encountered great difficulty in securing parental rights. Many courts have restricted post-divorce visitation on the basis of outdated stereotypes and misconceptions regarding
sexual orientation and gay parenting. This Note shows that homosexudial father on the children);Joseph M. Healy,Jr. et al., Children and Their FathersAfter Parental Separation, 60 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 531, 540-41 (1990) (study showed that although

frequent visitation was beneficial to male children, frequent visits correlated with low selfesteem in female children).
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit contend that visitation is not always necessary for the

child. "Visits under favorable circumstances are, at best, a poor substitute for a parent in
the family. Weekend visits do not compensate the child for parental absence at crucial
moments in his life." GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 118-19 n.*; see also supra note 10.
But see Novinson, supra note 10, at 146-62 (criticizing Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's conclusions regarding visitation).
171. JANET R. JoHNSON & LINDA E. G. CAMPBELL, IMPASSES OF DIVORCE: THE DYNAMICS
AND RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT 253-54

(1988).

172. R. Neugebauer, Divorce, Custody, and Visitation: The Child's Point of View, 12 J. DivORCE 153, 166-67 (1988-89).

173. Id.
174. Anne H. Fishel, Children's Adjustment in Divorced Families, 19 YOUTH & Soc'Y 173,
194 (1987).
175. Carol W. Tierney, Visitation Patterns and Adjustment of Preschool Children of
Divorce 132, 138 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado
(Boulder)).
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ality alone is not a permissible basis for visitation denial or restriction. If
a child is denied regular contact with and affection from the noncustodial parent, greater harm will likely result from the deprivation of parental contact than from any possible adverse effect of a parent's sexual
orientation. Absent an affirmative showing of harm to the child from the
parent's homosexuality, courts should acknowledge the fundamental
rights of gay and lesbian parents and allow unrestricted visitation.
David L. Weiden*

* The author would like to thank Professor Penelope Bryan for her helpful comments and guidance.

